Accepted Papers:

Peihua Li, Jiong Guo. Possible and Necessary Winner Problems in Iterative Elections with Multiple Rules

Mengjing Chen, Yang Liu, Weiran Shen, Yiheng Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Qiang Yang. A Mechanism Design Approach for Multi-Party Machine Learning

Xiang Liu, Weiwei Wu, Wanyuan Wang, Yuhang Xu, Xiumin Wang, Helei Cui. Budget-Feasible Sybil-Proof Mechanisms for Crowdsensing

Invited Talks:

Xinhang Lu. Truthful Cake Sharing

Ying Wen. An Efficient Algorithm for Approximating Nash Equilibrium in Zero-sum Imperfect-information Games

Fang-Yi Yu. Escaping Saddle Points: from Agent-based Models to Stochastic Gradient Descent